I dont see the incentive. If he can get a deal before the Cubs paid him not to play, why wouldnt he take that?

In a more general sense, some guys like Griffeys age/stature are chasing numbers and/or milestones, so sitting out does them no good, especially on the off chance that Cubs “might need” him incase someone gets hurt.

Beyond the theory of whether a player would accept these terms, how would having a player like this work with the 25 man/40 man rosters? Stashing an aging superstar may be a nice luxury, but is it worth leaving a real prospect unprotected?

As a thought-experiment it’s somewhat interesting. But I think you’re confusing your terms.

In your bank example, Bank #3 agrees to such a settlement in part because they are capable of participating in the market in others ways. You aren’t paying them to end business. You’re paying them to merely divert business through other means, which can be economically justifiable if provided enough compensation.

Now in the baseball example you cite, I think you mistake terms. In such a game theory, the “Game Participants” are the Franchises; The baseball players are commodities. I.e. The player would have to represent the object over which the bargaining takes place; not the partner with which bargaining occurs. Why is this so? Because baseball contracts (either to play or not to play) are exclusionary: the team that the player signed with gets sole custody of all services performed for the duration of the contract. Such a contract doesn’t allow the diversion of market; it closes the market.

To be comparable to your bank example then, the player would represent Bank #2. Your negotiation would have to be with every other franchise in baseball (Bank #3), where you pay them not to bid. Obviously, utilizing this strategy would therefore represent illegal collusion among teams.

It’s probably conceivable to think of some sort of game theory that encompasses franchise to player interaction, but the size of the pool of participants involved (ie all baseball players) means that there is far to much liklihood of player defection in the course of negotiation. Avoiding it would create far too great a distortion of market to make it worth it.

Lastly, baseball players become baseball players because they want to play the game. I’d be surprised if the monetary incentive would be great enough to overcome that desire.

Anyway, hopefully that was somewhat clear. Game theory is interesting and kind of fun. My grad degree centers on the multi-layered variety (International Relations), so I spent far to much time in the trenches with it. But it’s essential to maintain correct correlations to make a meaningful analysis.

That is the kind of thought that brought about Trust busting and after the Great Depression.

I think the Cubs should pay Griffey to play for the Cardinals or Brewers, not the other way around.

But on a theoretical level, this would never be allowed by either the players or the owners. It probably runs into the collusion rule anyway.

the “anti- Maddux” and I consider his contract disgusting but to be fair it merely said he did not have to go on road trips he was not scheduled to pitch in so he did in fact make the majority of trips. A selfish ass to be sure but he did indeed travel with the team most of the time.